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Governing protracted displacement
What access to solutions for forcibly displaced people?
Marion Noack, Martin Wagner, Carolien Jacobs
The governance of displacement and access to protection are 
closely linked to solutions for displaced people that refer to 
both the capability of displaced persons to rebuild their lives 
after displacement and the opportunities available to do so. 
Current policies to address displacement follow the (often 
artificial) division of governance structures for displacement. 
Available solutions are usually closely related to the classi-
fication of displaced persons into different categories. The 
qualification of a person as a refugee, an internal displaced 
person (IDP) or a labour migrant entails what kind of solu-
tions provided by the international community are accessible 
and whether a person can rely on the support by a dedicated 
agency, or whether the person is left unsupported. Govern-
ance structures, however, often overlap and lead to signifi-
cant gaps at the same time, leading to protracted displace-
ment characterised by vulnerability, dependency and legal 
insecurity owing to continuous cycles of displacement and a 
lack of durable solutions.
 
Central findings and recommendations
1 Multiple actors and multiple frameworks govern dis-
placement globally and at a regional level. Their mandates 
partially overlap and the categorisation of displaced persons, 
closely linked to the institutional mandates and definitions 
in legal frameworks, result in protection gaps for certain 
groups concerned. Bridging the gap between humanitarian/
emergency relief and protection and development assistance 
by forming integrated approaches will better account for the 
needs of displaced populations. 
2 The governance framework of displacement centres on 
the objective of providing protection. Yet, protection in 
itself provides only part of the solution for individuals. With 
the endurance of conflicts and the increase in protracted 
displacement situations, this (short-term) protection need 
should be coupled with longer-term perspectives to access 
livelihoods and, as such, solutions.
3 Solutions are often lacking or are not tailored to the needs 
of the individual.  People in protracted displacement will 
aim to find solutions on their own, making use of  different 
forms of mobility and transnational networks. Current ap-
proaches to forced displacement and access to solutions need 
to be better equipped to support those individual strategies.
4 Legal and policy frameworks and humanitarian action in 
the field of displacement are not yet reflecting protracted 
displacement sufficiently. Policy development with regard 
to protracted displacement situations should be inspired by 
an in-depth understanding of the respective individual coping 
strategies and displaced persons’ requirements for leaving 
those situations.
5 Individuals make use of various pathways to access  
protection and find a livelihood for themselves. The notion 
of solutions should hence be broadened to encompass the 
range of options that pave the way for forcibly displaced  
people to exercise basic rights all human beings should enjoy.
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1 Governance of forced displacement at 
the global level
The international regime governing displacement shows a 
number of gaps, most notably with regard to displaced 
people who are not covered by the definition of refugee of 
the Refugee Convention, for example internally displaced 
persons. These protection gaps translate into solution gaps 
for displaced people.
The governance of forced displacement involves multiple 
actors and multiple political levels of governance that operate 
at different geographical scales and within different remits: The 
governance of displacement lacks clarity and coherence. Forced 
displacement is not treated comprehensively at the global level, 
but developed over the years in a piecemeal fashion and as a 
highly fragmented area (see Figure 1 below).
With the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) on 10 December 1948, the United Nations General 
Assembly defined basic civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights that all human beings should enjoy. By becoming 
parties to international treaties, states assume obligations and 
duties under international law to respect, to protect and to fulfil 
human rights. The obligation to protect requires states to take 
positive action to facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights 
(Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31 (n13) para 8). 
The duty and responsibility of states to protect, however, fails 
in situations where individuals are either unwilling or cannot 
avail themselves under the protection of the country of origin or 
habitual residence. These situations can be manifold: The state 
may be the very source why someone needs to flee, or the state 
may not be in the position to protect in the sense of international 
human rights law, for instance, due to war and indiscriminate 
violence, deprivation of basic needs due to natural disasters, 
etc. In such cases, different global actors assume responsibility 
for some groups of displaced people. Yet others cannot lean on 
advocacy and patronage of one of those international actors.
The most elaborate framework that exists in the field of forced 
displacement relates to those people who are subject to individual 
persecution and crossed a national border. The 1951 Refugee Con-
vention and its 1967 protocol provide the normative framework 
for asylum at the global level, having been ratified by 142 states. 
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), ratified by 168 state 
parties, along with other international instruments, complements 
the Refugee Convention. It laid the foundation for the notion of 
non-refoulement, which means that no state party shall expel, 
return or extradite a person to another state where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of 
being subjected to torture. The CAT is broadly recognised as 
customary international law. 
The Refugee Convention, or rather its interpretation and 
practical application, struggles to address many contemporary 
situations of displacement which are often recurring over pro-
tracted periods of time. It is based on a territorial understanding 
of protection, that is a person needs to reach a safe host state to 
apply for international protection there. A consequence of this is 
that people’s chances of reaching a safe country depend on their 
Figure 1: Milestones of the governance of displacement     © ICMPD, Camilla Fogli, Marion Noack, Martin Wagner 
TRAFIG policy brief no.1  •  01/2020  •  2 TRAFIG policy brief no.1  •  01/2020  •  3
2. Governance of forced displacement at 
the regional level
The TRAFIG project specifically focusses on East Africa and the 
Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), Tanzania), the Middle East and South Asia (Jordan,  
Pakistan) as well as Europe (Greece, Italy, Germany). Our analysis 
of existing governance frameworks (Ferreira et al., forthcoming) 
shows that regional approaches and their implementation vary 
across the countries in the regions; most seem to be still nascent 
or remain a compilation of country-level programmes. 
In the Middle East, refugee issues are in practice addressed by 
national legislation and Memoranda of Understanding with 
UNHCR. In addition, the Arab League has developed several 
regional instruments of relevance to refugees and protracted 
displacement. Within the South Asian region, regional regimes 
impacting on protracted displacement primarily focus on Afghan 
refugees and emphasise return or repatriation. Tripartite agree-
ments have been an important instrument and the legal basis 
for UNHCR’s repatriation programme since the 2000s, com-
plemented by a regional policy framework entitled Solutions 
Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR) since 2012. 
In East Africa and the Horn of Africa, progress has been made 
to protect internally displaced persons (IDPs) better, a large part 
being in situations of protracted displacement—as shown below 
with the 2009 African Union Kampala Convention and the OAU 
Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa as the most prominent examples. 
economic conditions, their networks and support while those 
without such means are limited to the region close to the country 
from which they fled, or, in the worst case, are not able to flee 
at all and remain confined (Vollmer, 2019). Fifty years after 
the adoption of the Refugee Convention, internally displaced 
people (IDPs), for a long time under the radar of international 
attention, became subject of the—legally guiding, but not bind-
ing—UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in 2001.
Responding to some of these challenges, the New York 
Declaration on Refugees and Migrants adopted in September 
2016 established the separate processes to create the Global 
Compact on Refugees (the Refugee Compact, affirmed by the 
United Nations General Assembly on 7 December 2018) and 
the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration 
(the Migration Compact; adopted by the General Assembly on 
19 December 2018). The New York Declaration calls for global 
approaches and global solutions to large movements and reiter-
ates commitments to the human rights of refugees and migrants 
“regardless of status” on the basis of over 30 references to hu-
man rights (Guild, 2019). The resulting Global Refugee Com-
pact directly targets the challenge of protracted displacement 
and identifies the facilitation of access to durable solutions as 
one of its primary objectives. The Refugee Compact calls for 
innovation and action to ease pressure on host communities, to 
improve refugee self-reliance, to increase access to third-country 
solutions and to create the necessary conditions for voluntary 
return in safety and dignity in the countries of origin. 
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In the global displacement governance regime, Serge could 
be identified as an IDP, living in a situation of recurrent and 
protracted displacement. To access safety and livelihoods, he 
mainly relies on his own strategies by making use of mobility 
and social connections, outside of any formal frameworks for 
protection and only with very limited aid. When looking in more 
in detail into how individuals like Serge navigate (or are being 
navigated) between these various layers of governance of dis-
placement, its challenges and gaps become more apparent. 
Are there durable solutions for cases like his? Where can he 
and his family access which solutions? How are these solutions 
impacted by the (absence of) protection regimes and the work of 
humanitarian and development actors on these solutions? How, 
does Serge’s strategy link with these regimes or programmes?
What solutions can Serge access within the broader region of 
the DRC?
Countries in the region, including Serge’s home country, have 
made great strides to better protect IDPs—a large part of whom 
is in situations of protracted displacement. The 2006 Pact on 
Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region 
includes two legally binding protocols on IDPs and returnees.  
In addition, the 2009 African Union Kampala Convention for the 
Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in  
Africa specifically addresses internal displacement on the continent. 
Nevertheless, despite the country’s engagement with these instru-
ments and its high number of IDPs, dedicated national legislation 
and infrastructures have not yet been developed in the DRC. 
As a result, Serge cannot rely on the protection of his country  
of origin, as it does not provide sufficient protection or access to 
basic human rights. Serge and his wife, like many people who 
have been displaced repeatedly in their lives in DRC, rely on 
their own strategies to protect their lives and find ways to sustain 
themselves, making use of mobility among other strategies. 
When Serge and his wife decided to move to Bukavu, they re-
ceived assistance from translocal networks (in his case his uncle) 
that reach from his home village to Bukavu, the provincial cap-
ital of the South Kivu. They further diversify their income-gen-
eration activities: Serge changed his livelihood from farming to 
commercial activities. 
What solutions are accessible outside the country of origin?
What if the barbarism reached a level beyond indiscriminate vio-
lence, threatening the life of Serge and his family even more and 
affecting their networks and livelihood strategies, making their 
life in the DRC impossible? How would their situation differ if 
they had crossed a border to access protection? How would it 
affect their situation and access to solutions if they fell under the 
patronage of an international organisation? Would their coping 
strategies differ?
In Europe, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) has 
developed since 1999: While the term “protracted displacement” 
is not used in the CEAS, much of its development is closely 
linked to it as it aimed to reduce “situations of limbo”. However, 
a number of people still fall outside this protection framework. 
Specific EU policies and programmes explicitly related to pro-
tracted displacement such as the EC 2016 communication ‘lives 
in dignity’ have largely been developed from the perspective of 
development and humanitarian aid, both within and outside the 
so-called “external dimension” of the European Union’s migra-
tion and asylum policy, thus regarding protracted displacement 
as a phenomenon that exists outside the European Union (EU).
3. Interconnected pathways to protection 
and access to solutions in practice
What solutions can Serge access within the DRC?
Serge is 37 years old and originally comes from a village in the 
east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). He was 
robbed numerous times by different rebel groups and bandits. 
From 2008 until 2017, he and his extended family had been on 
the move, from one village to the next due to the barbaric acts. 
In 2017, he returned to his home area but decided to stay in the 
wider region in a place called Bulambika and not to go back to 
farming as the risks were too high. His wife was then engaged 
in some commercial activities that were negatively affected by 
insecurity, corruption and local politics. After becoming again a 
victim of rebel group attacks, Serge and his wife moved to Buka-
vu—the capital of DRC’s South Kivu province located along the 
Congolese–Rwandese border. Due to internal displacement and 
other forms of migration, the city has grown exponentially in 
recent decades to an estimated population of one million. Many 
of the humanitarian aid organisations have their main offices 
in Bukavu, but interventions are usually not taking place in the 
city but only in the surrounding territories. Serge’s uncle helped 
them to identify a neighbourhood where they could live because 
they wanted to stay connected “with their own people”. Serge 
is currently trading in palm oil at Bukavu’s central market. In 
Bulambika, where he and his wife lived previously, they had 
received assistance from some local development associations 
and international aid organisations provided to the community. 
However, to receive aid from international organisations, one 
often needs good connections with the village leaders. Serge 
and his family only once received aid from Caritas. Since they 
moved to Bukavu, they have not received any aid, neither from 
the state nor from any other organisation.
Serge’s story is based on an interview that was carried out in 
Bukavu on 3 October 2019 within the TRAFIG research in DRC.
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One such individualised solution would be the path of labour 
mobility, which requires formal documents that are hard to 
obtain and a solid network with employers or diaspora abroad. 
In 2018, only 252 workers from the DRC had a residence permit 
in the EU, the majority of those having chosen to stay in France 
(Eurostat; unless not otherwise stated, Eurostat data for 2018 is 
being used). 
Another legal pathway relates to the availability of social net-
works and ties in EU countries. Such “social capital”, however, 
only supports mobility based on a narrow definition of family, 
extending to spouses and unmarried partners “in a stable rela-
tionship” as well as (unmarried and “underage”) children (Art. 4  
Family Reunification Directive 2003/86/EC). The Directive also 
grants the right to family reunification to refugees (and does not 
exclude this right to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection). Still, 
recognised refugees may need to fulfil certain requirements (sta-
ble and regular income and/or housing), and beneficiaries of sub-
sidiary protection may need to wait a certain period before they 
may sponsor the family reunification. To seek family reunification 
for Serge would be thus only an option if his spouse had already 
been granted refugee status. In 2018, France issued 1,790 first 
permits to family members of Congolese sponsors with refugee 
status residing in France whereas only to 30 sponsors with sub-
sidiary protection status.
In the absence of existing networks the right qualifications and 
related documentation, the labour migration or family reunifica-
tion pathway will be of no use for Serge. Claiming international 
protection would thus be the only remaining option to enter 
the EU. Arguably, one of the most decisive weaknesses of the 
global refugee regime is that the 1951 Refugee Convention does 
not say how people seeking protection should access it. The 
Convention should, according to its drafters, regulate the legal 
status of refugees who have already been accepted in a receiving 
state, whereas it should not touch upon the question of admitting 
refugees. In the EU, this gap has been translated into an adaption 
of the safe third-country principle enshrined in the Dublin Reg-
ulation that transfers the responsibility for an application to the 
first country where an applicant reached the EU, mainly an EU 
external border country such as Greece, Italy or Spain.
An exception to this rule is resettlement, entailing the transfer 
of refugees from an asylum country to another country that 
has agreed to admit them and ultimately grant them permanent 
settlement status, as one of three propagated “durable solutions”. 
Resettlement is usually restricted to vulnerable people. In 2018, 
1,100 Congolese were resettled to six different countries within 
the EU, the majority of them to Sweden (615 persons), the United 
Kingdom (280) and Finland (130). Serge, as a middle-aged man 
would hardly be recognised to be in special need of resettlement. 
Consequently, reaching Europe would most likely require a 
perilous journey outside formal governance channels via the 
Mediterranean to Italy (reportedly only 75 Congolese took this 
path in 2018) or via Greece (reportedly 1,470 Congolese opted 
for this route in 2018).
Countries in East Africa and the Horn of Africa have been and 
still are major host countries of refugees, particularly following 
a series of conflicts and related massive displacements in the 
1990s. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention 
on the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU 
Convention) further developed the definition of a refugee in 1969 
by expanding it to cases of generalised conflict and violence. At 
the same time, approaches in the region emphasise humanitar-
ian assistance over long-term development and access to local 
integration. 
Encampment, with restrictions on mobility and barriers to access 
to employment, and repatriations in situations where feasible, 
still dominate in most countries. In its 1998 Refugee’s Act, Tan-
zania, for example, that hosts around 73,000 out of the 890,000 
refugees from the DRC, does not provide for ‘durable solutions’. 
Although the government granted citizenship to 162,000 former 
Burundian refugees in 2015, it generally implements a firm 
encampment policy for refugees. Ethiopia, in contrast, adopted 
its revised National Refugee Proclamation No. 1110/2019 in 
January 2019, which was marked as one of the most progressive 
refugee policies in Africa. It entails comprehensive provisions 
on local integration, yet the related National Comprehensive 
Refugee Response Strategy, which will provide the framework 
for the implementation of the government’s pledges for the im-
plementation of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Frame-
work, is still pending approval. If Serge qualified as a refugee 
(outside the DRC) within the region, he and his wife would 
probably engage in some forms of mobility to support their lives, 
despite formal restrictions on mobility and barriers to access 
employment, while partially relying on limited aid provided 
by humanitarian actors, NGOs or the UNHCR. Serge would 
regularly travel to the closest city to engage in trading. Owing 
to the restrictions on formal mobility, he would need to resort to 
bribery and possibly later informally obtain a national ID card. 
With such a card, he could move around, access formal employ-
ment and a greater degree of security. His wife would engage in 
some incentive-based employment with UNHCR or local NGOs. 
They might also receive remittances from relatives living in 
bigger cities on the continent or further abroad.
In the absence of solutions in the neighbourhood, what 
third-country solutions are there in Europe?
Under the dire prospects of longer-term solutions, how would 
Serge’s situation change if he had moved to Europe, for example? 
What coping strategies, forms of mobility and networks of sup-
port could he rely on? 
In the absence of solutions within the country or the wider re-
gion, Serge may opt to move to the European Union (EU) as an 
area of freedom and safety and a strong economic market with a 
variety of options. Nonetheless, reaching the EU and access to 
those options depends on his human, social and economic capital 
and the recognition of this capital (e.g. recognition of education-
al qualifications or his skills) by a country within the EU. 
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Which rights are there for refugees in Europe?
Overall, 7,525 individuals from the DRC applied for interna-
tional protection in the EU in 2018. 1,470 Congolese applied 
in Greece, supposedly as the first country of entry into the EU. 
Nonetheless, for many Congolese applicants, the language and 
existing networks seemed to determine the preferred country of 
destination, with 4,365 applications having been submitted in 
France. In 2018, EU member states decided on 7,405 applica-
tions from citizens from the DRC. 2,100 of these were granted 
refugee protection (28%), 220 subsidiary protection (3%) and 
4,980 applications were rejected (67%). Overall, Greece decided 
on 575 applications from citizens of the DRC and France on 
5,220 applications. Both countries’ recognition rates are similar 
to EU-wide trends.
During the asylum procedure, Serge would not be able to work 
nor to move freely between EU countries. EU law grants access 
to the labour market only after a waiting period of nine months 
(Reception Conditions Directive (recast), Art 15). Often, the 
movement of asylum seekers is also restricted within the country 
where they apply for international protection. In Greece, where 
arrivals from the DRC formed the third-largest group in 2019 
(UNHCR Operational Data Portal on the Mediterranean Situation), 
as a first stage in the asylum procedure, vulnerable people are 
transferred to the mainland as well as fast-track Syrian cases. 
As an applicant from the DRC, Serge would need to remain in 
one of the reception and identification centres (RIC, ‘hotspot’) 
created on the Aegean Islands. The situation in those centres is 
precarious, as recently shown in a report by the European Court 
of Audits, which particularly criticised the lack of reception 
capacity and the resulting dire situation in makeshift tents. At the 
end of October, the five RICs hosted 30,700 people, almost six 
times more than their maximum capacity of 5,400, as reported 
by UNHCR. 
If Serge were among the roughly 30 per cent of citizens of the 
DRC who receive refugee status in the EU, he could enjoy full 
access to the labour market, social welfare systems, education, 
etc.—essentially all rights of an EU citizen except political 
rights. Beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, however, have 
more limited access to rights. Above all, their residence status 
is reviewed periodically, and they are granted a temporary resi-
dence of at least one year. While refugee status provides a more 
long-term perspective, subsidiary protection only allows bene-
ficiaries to carry on with their lives to a limited extent. Family 
reunification is often restricted within a certain waiting period. 
Access to jobs is often hampered due to the temporariness of the 
status. Yet, beneficiaries of refugee status do not enjoy the right 
to settle elsewhere within the EU either. Their status is not rec-
ognised throughout the EU but is linked to the issuing member 
state. To be allowed to move elsewhere in the EU, Serge would 
need to wait for five years (according to the Long Term Resi-
dence Directive). At the end of 2018, 63,489 Congolese had a 
long-term residence status in different EU countries, the majority 
of whom in France, Belgium and Sweden. 
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This policy brief is based on the forthcoming TRAFIG working 
paper no. 3 “Governing protracted displacement: An analysis 
across global, regional and domestic contexts” by Ferreira et al. 
It draws on comparative insights from eight different countries 
that host large groups of displaced people and which are the focus 
of the TRAFIG project: Greece, Germany and Italy in Europe; 
Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and 
Tanzania in Africa; and Jordan and Pakistan in Asia.
Conclusions
Solutions refer to both the capability of displaced persons to 
rebuild their lives after displacement and the opportunities 
available to do so. Solutions can be understood as paving the 
way towards being able to fully exercise the civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights that all human beings 
should enjoy.
Serge’s case and his hypothetical pathways show that access to 
solutions is highly impacted by his social and economic capital 
and the governance framework for protection available to him. 
Serge is unlikely to be able to go along the highly selective legal 
and labour migration channel. Similarly, his chances of reaching 
a safe country depend on Serge’s economic conditions, his net-
works and support. Without such means, the possible solutions 
are limited to the region close to the country from where he fled. 
At the same time, Serge is engaged in creating and finding solu-
tions on his own, building on multiple local and translocal social 
networks and mobility—like many other displaced people all 
over the world (Etzold, Belloni, King, Kraler, & Pastore, 2019; 
Vollmer, 2019). These individual strategies are, however, not 
always supported by the governance regimes offering protection 
for displaced people. 
To expand solutions for forcibly displaced people, it is key that 
governance regimes take those individual human, social and 
economic capitals more into account. They ultimately will allow 
forcibly displaced people such as Serge to more directly access 
basic human rights and thus durable and individual solutions.
Figure 2: Governance of and solutions for forcibly displaced people
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